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COMMENT / Legal Aspects of Commercial Bank
Issuance of Subordinated Debt*
Section 1: Introduction
In recent years, corporations seeking to expand their capital base have found
a tremendous market for subordinated debt securities among insurance com-
panies, pension trusts, and other long-term investors.' Surprisingly, however,
the legal implications of this type of financing have received relatively little
attention from commentators; commercial bank issuance of these instru-
ments has occasioned even less.2 This comment will discuss the use of sub-
ordinated debt instruments by commercial banks.3 The concept, origin and
* The author, J. James Gallagher, was associated with the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency from 1963-67; served as Chief, Capital Increase Section in 1964-65, and has exten-
sive experience in the banking field. The opinions expressed by the author are his own and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the Comptroller of Currency.
1. A review of securities offerings placed through underwriters in the first half of 1967,
shows that United States corporations sold over $1,680,000,000 of subordinated debentures
on the domestic market. See INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, Aug. 11, 1967, at 25-43.
2. Several excellent articles have dealt with the economic aspects of bank issuance of
subordinated debt. See generally citations in Section III infra. But thus far there has been
no treatment of the legal aspects of this relatively new phenomenon in banking.
3. The term "commercial bank" identifies financial institutions which hold demand de-
posit accounts, transferable by check, which are used as money or means of payment. These
institutions should be distinguished from savings and loan associations, mutual savings
banks, credit unions, etc., none of which holds' demand deposits and all having a more
limited scope of financial services than the commercial bank.
As they are known today, commercial banks perform three basic functions: (1) acting as
administrators of the money supply, (2) creating new money, and (3) lending. In addition,
they provide savings and other time deposit facilities, administer estates through their trust
departments, act as insurance agents and underwriters, provide brokerage and mortgage
banking services, and perform numerous other services incidental to their primary financial
activities.
For an informative compilation of material comparing commercial banks with the numer-
ous other types of financial institutions. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, HOUSE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., COMPARATIVE REGULATIONS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Subcomm. Print 1963).
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prevalence, advantages and disadvantages, and legality of "capital notes" or
"debentures"-the "debt that serves as equity" 4-will be explored.
Banking is a unique industry in many ways. Unlike other corporations,
banks do not exist merely for the sake of their shareholders. They are inti-
mately involved with the general public interest through their depository
and money-creating characteristics; their efficient functioning is vital to a
strong economy. As a consequence, close governmental supervision of the
banking industry has been a constant political pattern since the Civil War.
In 1863, the establishment of the National Banking System under the juris-
diction of the Comptroller of the Currency,5 created our unique "dual bank-
ing system" 6 of state chartered and federally chartered banks (state banks
and national banks, respectively). Subsequent legislation added more fed-
eral supervisors-the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
Fed)7 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (F.D.I.C.).8 These
4. Johnson, Subordinated Debentures: Debt That Serves as Equity, 10 J. FINANCE 1 (1955).
5. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency was created as a bureau of the Treasury
Department by the National Currency Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665. The Currency Act was re-
vised in toto by the National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99.
Though subject to the general supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Comp-
troller is charged by statute with many responsibilities which he alone must meet and for
the carrying out of which he is answerable only to the President and to Congress. Generally,
he must maintain the solvency and liquidity of the national banking system; specifically,
the Comptroller must approve all entries into the national banking system by new charter,
branching, or conversion of a state bank, and all important corporate actions of a national
bank such as mergers, capital increases or reductions, changes in charter, etc.
6. This term is used to explain the curious anomaly existing in this country whereby
banks are independently chartered and supervised by both the federal government and the
individual states. The system is praised by many as the result of great insight by our fore-
fathers who saw that this supervisory structure would create a competitive spirit leading to
constant improvement of each system and redounding to the benefit of the public generally.
In fact, the dual banking system is the result of a miscalculation by the framers of the early
federal banking legislation. A prohibitive tax placed on state bank notes in 1865 was in-
tended to force them out of circulation. Proponents of this measure thought that all state
banks would convert to the national banking system in order to retain their note-issuing
privileges and that one national banking system would thus result. Instead, the state banks
found that they could survive and profit on deposit banking alone. The dual banking system
has prospered since that time. For further discussion of the early banking history of this
country, see P. Cagan, The First Fifty Years of the National Banking System-An Historical
Appraisal, in BANKING AND MONETARY STUDIES 15 (D. Carson ed. 1963).
7. The Federal Reserve System was created by the Federal Reserve Act, 38 Stat. 251 (1913),
12 U.S.C. §§ 221-26 (1964). The Fed is composed of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks
which operate under the general supervision of the Board of Governors in Washington,
D.C. The Board has extensive supervisory authority over banks which belong to the Sys-
tem (member banks). By virtue of the fact that all national banks must be members, certain
jurisdictional disputes between the Comptroller and the Fed have arisen over the years.
8. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was created by the Banking Act of 1933,
48 Stat. 168, 12 U.S.C. § 263 (1964), to pay the depositors of failed banks the amount of their
insured deposits. Insurance, initially limited to $2,500 for each depositor, has recently been
raised to $15,000. In addition to its role as insurer, F.D.I.C. is named, pursuant to 64 Stat. 884
(1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (c) (1964), as receiver in all national bank liquidations, and has been
granted extensive supervisory power over state banks which wish to acquire deposit insur-
ance. For enumeration of these powers, see generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-31 (1964).
The supervisory powers of the F.D.I.C. are substantially enhanced by the policy of most
[Vol. XVII
Comments
three agencies all have supervisory responsibilities under the federal statu-
tory scheme; however, each one has a distinct mission which colors its ap-
proach to banking problems. The Fed is primarily a monetary authority; the
F.D.I.C., an insurance agency. Only the Comptroller is primarily concerned
with the structure and powers of national banks. The system is further com-
plicated by the fact that state chartered banks (comprising more than 60
percent of the country's commercial banks) are subject to primary regulation
by state banking authorities, in addition to regulation by the Fed and/or the
F.D.I.C.
It is, therefore, not surprising that in some cases the jurisdictional bound-
aries of bank regulatory agencies have become blurred. Those situations
where more than one supervisory authority may interpret the same statute
with respect to a bank's activities have led to conflicts of interpretation and
jurisdictional confusion. In fact, the question of the proper function of sub-
ordinated debt in banking was recently the subject of dispute among the fed-
eral bank regulatory agencies.9
The complexity of the banking structure, when coupled with the topic
of subordinated debt, compels the elimination of all possible collateral issues
from our consideration. Consequently, this discussion will concentrate pri-
marily upon national bank issuance of subordinated debt. These banks oper-
ate under a single federal law, as opposed to the diverse state laws; considera-
tion of the provisions of this single statutory scheme should help to focus
attention within a manageable framework. While reference will be made to
state law, this will generally be for purposes of illustration and clarification
rather than detailed discussion.
The powers which national banking associations (corporations) possess
are limited to those expressly conferred or fairly implied by the statutory
scheme under which they are incorporated.10 The provisions of 12 U.S.C. §24
(Seventh) and 12 U.S.C. §21 serve as the basis for the implied powers of na-
tional banks. 1 The theory of these implied powers will be dealt with at some
length, since borrowing authority is derived by implication and the issuance
of capital notes or debentures is necessarily tied to the power to borrow.
Since subordination agreements of the type to be discussed become opera-
tive within the context of insolvency proceedings, the receivership situation
states that a state chartered bank must have deposit insurance before it will be allowed to
open for business. While few states have statutes requiring F.D.I.C. membership for state
banks, existence of this policy enables F.D.I.C. to set standards for approval of deposit in-
surance which bear directly upon the organization and operation of state banks.
9. See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 602-04 (1966); Note, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 660 (1965).
10. First Nat'l Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
11. See Huck, What is the Banking Business?, 21 Bus. LAw. 537 (1966).
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must also be considered. A further complication in the discussion of bank
issuance of subordinated debt is created by the express exclusion of banks
from coverage under the National Bankruptcy Act,12 the statute which gov-
erns proceedings in most insolvencies. A significant body of case law in the
area of subordination has developed under this Act. In contrast, there is no
significant case law on the effect of subordinated debt in the event of bank
insolvency. It will be necessary, therefore, to analogize from precedents un-
der the Bankruptcy Act to the insolvent bank situation in order to deter-
mine the legal positions of the parties where subordinated debt has been
issued by a commercial bank.
Section II: The Concept of Subordination and Types of Agreements
Types of Subordination
Subordinated notes or debentures ("capital notes" or "capital debentures"
in banking parlance)13 are a species of the general category of senior securities.
Other types of instruments within this classification are mortgage bonds and
preferred stock.' 4 The latter types of senior securities will not be discussed
here, since they generally do not involve the concept of subordination.
A debenture is a bond unsecured by a lien or mortgage against the firm's
assets. It is a general obligation of the corporation and holds the same posi-
tion as obligations to other general creditors.15 The primary factor that dis-
tinguishes a subordinated debenture from an ordinary debenture is the subor-
dination agreement. The basic concept of subordination is quite simple; it is
the placement of an indebtedness (subordinate debt) in a position which is
subordinate and junior in right of payment to another indebtedness (senior
debt) of the common debtor.16
The concept of the subordination of a creditor's repayment rights is not
new. It has long been used by equity courts as a means of balancing the in-
terests of various creditors of an insolvent debtor;' 7 however, subordination
12. 30 Stat. 547 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
13. The difference between notes and debentures is one of form only. Technically, notes
are two party instruments between the issuer and purchaser while debentures are issued to
a trustee for the benefit of more numerous lenders. In this comment, as in actual practice,
the two terms will be used interchangeably.
14. B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIs 544 (4th ed. 1962).
15. E. SCHWARTZ, CORPORATION FINANCE 157 (1962).
16. For other definitions, see Everett, Subordinated Debt-Nature and Enforcement, 20
Bus. LAw. 953, 953-54 (1965); Calligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 YALE L.J. 376 (1961).
17. While the idea of subordination was established in equity, care must be taken not to
treat contractual subordination merely as a species or extension of the doctrine of equitable
subordination as enunciated in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) and Taylor v. Standard
Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939) (the "Deep Rock" case). Such a treatment was apparently
espoused in Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15
VAND. L. REV. 83, 92 (1961) and followed by the district court in In re Credit Industrial Corp.,
250 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The circuit court opinion in this case, quoted on point
in text at note 178 infra, presents a clear distinction between equitable and contractual
subordination.
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as treated here does not refer to this type of court-created and enforced equi-
table subordination. Rather, this comment will discuss contractual subordi-
nation, that is, subordination which arises by virtue of a specific agreement
between the common debtor and the subordinated creditor, not made in con-
templation of bankruptcy, and drawn in favor of other specified creditors
who by virtue of the agreement become senior creditors. Limiting the scope
of our inquiry still further, this comment will discuss only that type of con-
tractual subordination known as inchoate or ab initio's subordination. The
distinctive characteristic of an ab initio subordination agreement is that the
subordination is activated only in the event of any insolvency, bankruptcy,
or dissolution proceedings of the debtor. This type of subordination agree-
ment provides for periodic payments of interest to the subordinated creditor
and frequently provides either for payment into a sinking fund or direct
principal reduction during the term of the agreement. Exempted from dis-
cussion here is a type of contractual subordination known as complete or
subsequent subordination, wherein the common debtor is normally pre-
cluded from making any payments whatsoever on the subordinated debt
until the senior debt has been completely discharged.' 9
Common Provisions of Subordination Agreements
In national bank subordination agreements, which account for the vast
majority of the outstanding amount in bank capital notes, 20 the following is a
fairly typical subordination provision:
Anything in this Note to the contrary notwithstanding, the in-
debtedness evidenced by this Note shall be subordinate and junior
in right of payment, to the extent and in the manner hereinafter set
forth, to all obligations of the Bank to customers or depositors of
the Bank as such, obligations under banker's acceptances and letter
of credit, obligations arising out of transactions in federal funds
18. The terms are used by Calligar and Everett, supra note 16, respectively, with Everett,
who had the last word, characterizing the term inchoate as inappropriate, since subordina-
tion provisions become binding when the subordinated debt is issued. Everett, supra note 16,
at 956 n.8. Everett's criticism of the term seems sound when it is recognized that these are
agreements to subordinate which are fully in existence, requiring nothing to be done to
perfect the rights created, even though those rights are subject to a future contingency, i.e.,
insolvency, dissolution, etc. Another author has characterized the type of subordination
agreements which we will discuss in this paper as "major league subordinations." See Golin,
Debt Subordination as a Working Tool, 7 N.Y.L.F. 370, 372 (1961).
19. Golin, supra note 18, refers to this type of subordination instrument as "minor league
subordination" and characterizes it as having application principally to medium size, pri-
vately owned corporations and being employed mainly to obtain short-term revolving credit.
He speaks of this type of subordination as frequently encompassing such types of easily
subordinated debt as loans due to officers or stockholders.
20. Of the total of $1,350,290,000 of capital notes and debentures issued by commercial
banks during the period June 1963 through September 1966, national banks issued
$857,365,000 of these debt securities. THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, USE OF SENIOR
CAPITAL BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 53-70 (1967).
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and inter-bank credit facilities, and (except as to any funded debt)
its obligations to its other creditors, whether outstanding at the date
of this Note or incurred after the date of this Note (such indebted-
ness of the bank to which the Notes are subordinate and junior be-
ing sometimes herein referred to as "Superior Indebtedness") in
that:
In the event of any insolvency proceedings, or any receivership,
liquidation or other similar proceedings in connection therewith,
relative to the Bank or its creditors, as such, or to its property, and
in the event of any proceedings for voluntary or involuntary liqui-
dation, dissolution or other winding up of the Bank, whether or not
involving insolvency, then the holders of Superior Indebtedness
shall be entitled to receive payment in full of all principal and in-
terest on all Superior Indebtedness before the holders of subordi-
nated indebtedness shall be entitled to receive for application in
payment thereof any payment or distribution of any kind or char-
acter, whether in cash or property or securities, which may be pay-
able or deliverable in any such proceedings in respect of the Notes,
except payments or distributions made to holders of the Notes un-
der a lawful plan of reorganization of the Bank approved by final
judgment or order of a court or agency having lawful jurisdiction
to effect such reorganization which provides for payment to holders
of Superior Indebtedness of cash, property or securities fairly and
equitably reflecting in accordance with law the prior rights hereby
conferred on such holders.
This language constitutes the basic subordination provision. The primary
object of such a provision is that, in the event of any proceeding for volun-
tary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or other winding up of the af-
fairs of the bank, whether for insolvency or for any other reason, the holders
of the superior indebtedness will be entitled to receive full payment of prin-
cipal and interest on any amounts owing to them by the bank, before the
holders of the notes will be entitled to receipt of any payment of principal or
interest thereon. The expansive language of the subordination provision,
i.e., ".. . any proceedings for voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolu-
tion or other winding up of the Bank, whether or not involving insol-
vency..." would appear to raise a possible problem for a bank which wishes
either to merge or to sell all or substantially all of its assets in a purchase-
assumption agreement with another bank. In actual experience, however,
this problem has not materialized in view of other language in the typical
bank subordination agreement which provides that ".... in the event the
bank wishes to consolidate or merge with or into another corporation or
convert or sell or transfer all or substantially all of its property and as-
sets.. ." the bank will do so in accordance with a provision which stipulates
that any such consolidation, merger, conversion, sale, or transfer shall be
upon condition that:
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(a) the due and punctual payment of the principal, premium,
and interest on the Notes according to their terms and the due and
punctual performance and observance of all the terms, covenants
and conditions of the agreement or indenture to be kept or per-
formed by the bank shall be assumed by the corporation formed by or
resulting from or surviving any such consolidation or merger or con-
version or which shall have received the transfer of all or substanially
all of the property and assets of the bank as fully and effectually as if
such successor corporation had been the original party of the first
part and (b) such successor corporation shall be a banking institu-
tion subject to supervision or examination by state or federal au-
thority.
In addition to the above provisions, the following is usually added:
No present or future holder of Superior Indebtedness shall be
prejudiced in his right to enforce subordination of the Notes by
any act or failure to act on the part of the Bank. The provisions of
this section are solely for the purpose of defining the relative rights
of the holders of Superior Indebtedness on the one hand and the
holders of the Notes on the other hand, and nothing herein shall
impair, as between the Bank and the holders of any Note, the ob-
ligation of the bank, which is unconditional and absolute, to pay to
the holders thereof the principal, premium, if any, and interest
thereon in accordance with its terms, nor shall anything herein pre-
vent the holder of a Note from exercising all remedies otherwise
permitted by applicable law or hereunder upon default hereunder,
subject to the rights, if any, under this section of holders of Superior
Indebtedness to receive cash, property or securities, otherwise pay-
able or deliverable to holders of the Notes.
The intent of this clause is clearly to emphasize the fact that the bank's ob-
ligation to pay the subordinated debt in accordance with its terms is uncon-
ditional and absolute. The language is intended to eliminate any doubt that
the holders of the subordinated debt are creditors of the bank, not owners
or holders of common equity. Also, this is intended to prevent any inference
that superior creditors can in any way be prejudiced in their right to enforce
the subordination of the subordinated debt by virtue of the bank's acts or
failures to act.
The following provision has appeared in relatively few bank capital note
agreements; however, the holders of senior indebtedness would do well to in-
sist upon this wording since it precludes any possible arguments as to the
relative position of the parties at the time of insolvency.
The Bank agrees, for the benefit of the holders of Superior In-
debtedness, that in the event any Note is declared due and payable
before its expressed maturity because of the occurrence of a default
hereunder, all Superior Indebtedness shall, to the extent permitted
1967]
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by law, forthwith become immediately due and payable upon de-
mand regardless of the expressed maturity thereof.
This language gives the holders of the superior indebtedness a basis for ac-
celerating the maturity of the senior debt by demanding its payment. Of
course the purpose of the provision is to enable the holder of the superior
indebtedness to prove a matured claim at the same time that the holder of
the defaulted subordinated debt is entitled to prove a matured claim.
Recall that the typical subordination provision set out above specifically
excepted "funded debt" from the category of senior indebtedness and thus
from subordination by capital note holders. The following is a typical defi-
nition of "funded debt" (sometimes referred to as "long-term debt"):
The term 'funded debt' shall mean all indebtedness of the Bank
for borrowed money, whether secured or unsecured, having a final
maturity (or which is renewable or extendable at the option of the
obligor for a period ending) more than one year after the date of
creation thereof, notwithstanding the fact that payments in respect
of the principal thereof are required to be made by the obligor less
than one year after the date of creation thereof. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, the term 'funded debt' shall not include any liability
or obligation of the Bank, incidental to or incurred in the course of
its banking or trust business as from time to time constituted, with
respect to (1) any deposits with it or funds collected by it, (2) any
bankers' acceptance or letter of credit, (3) any check, note, certifi-
cate of deposit, money order, traveler's check, receipt, draft, bill of
exchange issued, accepted or endorsed by it, (4) any discount with,
borrowing from, or other obligation to, any Federal Reserve Bank,
(5) any agreement made by the Bank to purchase or repurchase
securities, loans or federal funds or any interest or participation in
any thereof, (6) any lease of real or personal property, purchase
money security agreement or similar instrument not involving an
obligation of the Bank for borrowed money, (7) any transaction in-
volving the lease by the Bank of real or personal property, sold by the
Bank or constructed or improved or to be constructed or improved
or acquired or to be acquired by a third party, which is used or to
be used by the Bank in the conduct of its banking or trust business
as from time to time constituted, (8) any guarantee or similar ob-
ligation as may be incidental or usual in carrying on the banking
or trust business of a bank or trust company or as may be permitted
by the Articles of Association of the Bank or as may otherwise be
permitted by law, (9) any transaction in the nature of an extension
of credit, whether in the form of a commitment, guarantee or other-
wise, undertaken by the Bank for the account of a third party with
the application by the Bank of the same banking considerations
that would be applicable if the transaction were a loan to such
party, (10) any transaction in which the Bank acts solely in a fidu-
ciary or agency capacity, or (11) liabilities incurred on account of
loans made to the Bank with the express approval of the Comp-
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troller of the Currency, given to the lender, under paragraph 9 of
5200 of the Revised Statutes as amended, (12 U.S.C. § 84).21
Note that the language of the subordination clause proper, when read to-
gether with the definition of "funded debt," provides a deep subordination
wherein the holders of capital notes stand just one step ahead of the holders
of equity securities and on a par with, or senior to, the holders of other
funded debt. Note also that the subordination which is typical in subordi-
nated debentures issued by nonbanking corporations is deeper, in the sense
that the provisions of those agreements are expressly intended to subordi-
nate the claims of the debenture holders to those of the holders of funded
debt, whether outstanding at the date of issuance of the debentures or in-
curred thereafter. This fact, however, appears to be of minimal effect upon
the relative depth of the subordination in capital notes or debentures when
it is recalled that there are myriad exceptions to the term "funded debt" as
used in these debt securities. This deep subordination, typical of bank sub-
ordination agreements, serves to illustrate the description, "subordinated de-
bentures stand in relation to general creditors as common equity stands in
relation to preferred stock." 22 In fact, it is just this relationship which has
caused the Comptroller of the Currency to rule that national banks may is-
sue capital notes and may, for certain purposes, count them as a part of their
capital structure.23
The definition of "funded debt" is significant primarily for its exceptions.
Because of the various types of debt which a bank will incur in the normal
course of its business, the most prominent of which is its deposit liabilities,
the rather specific delineation of exceptions to the term "funded debt" has
been thought desirable. The exceptions are intended to insure that normal
bank transactions will not be impeded by the legitimate restrictions on
funded debt which may be required by the capital note purchaser. Most of
these exceptions are indispensable if the note agreement or indenture is to
receive the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. Because of this in-
21. Exception 11 to the definition of "funded debt" incorporates, with a slight explana-
tory comment, the language of exception nine to 38 Stat. 264 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1964).
Section 82 places a restriction on national banks as to the indebtedness which they may
lawfully incur (100% of capital stock and 50% of unimpaired surplus fund) and exception
nine removes that limit with respect to loans made to subject bank by another national
bank pursuant to the express approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, given to the
lending bank, as called for in exception nine to 34 Stat. 451 (1906), 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964)
(section restricting to 10% of capital stock and 10% of unimpaired surplus, the amount
which a national bank may loan to any one borrower).
The apparent purpose for including such an exception to "funded debt" is to assure that
the powers granted to the Comptroller by statute will not be effectively withdrawn by private
agreement of the capital note issuer and purchaser. The thought, no doubt, being that if a
large number of banks have capital notes outstanding and this exception is not included in
the agreement, such an abrogation of statutory prerogative will have been accomplished.
22. Golin, supra note 18, at 372.
23. See text infra pp. 89-93, for discussion of this point.
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sistence by the Comptroller, there is little reason for the parties to negotiate
these points. At least two of the noted exceptions, however, directly affect
the interests of the parties, are not absolutely required by the Comptroller
and thus, on occasion, generate considerable negotiating activity.
The sale and lease-back transaction (exception number 7) is, to the ex-
tent that it represents an additional means of raising capital funds, a fore-
runner of the bank capital note device. Briefly, the transaction works as fol-
lows: A bank which desires to acquire additional working capital without
selling common stock establishes a real estate affiliate or subsidiary and sells
all or a part of its banking premises to the subsidiary. The subsidiary then
acquires a mortgage loan on the property, which is additionally collateral-
ized by a lease from the bank. The bank's balance sheet shows a nominal
investment in its real estate affiliate and a reduced investment in banking
premises. The transaction has the effect of allowing the bank to acquire
funds to be used in its normal business operations while not incurring any
"debt," since obligations under a lease are normally not considered a liabil-
ity on the bank's books and do not utilize the bank's legal borrowing limit.24
Because a sale and lease-back transaction has the effect of removing an asset
(the bank building) from the bank, some capital note purchasers are un-
derstandably reluctant to allow this exception to the restrictions placed on
other types of funded debt.25
Exception 11 should also be noted, since it allows for an emergency situa-
tion in which the bank has become financially distressed and in need of large
sums of money to meet a pressing demand. By virtue of this exception, the
provisions of exception nine to Sections 82 and 84 of Title 1226 are preserved;
the Comptroller does not lose the flexibility provided him in the law to al-
low the lending bank (Section 84) to exceed its statutory lending limit to
any one person and the borrowing bank (Section 82) to exceed the limita-
tion on the amounts which it might borrow. It is understandable that pur-
chasers of capital notes might balk at this provision, since it effectively re-
writes the agreement when the issuing bank experiences a distress situation.
On the other hand, it is likely that if an exception 11 emergency situation
were to occur, the subordinated creditor would find it in his best interest to
24. See discussion of sale and lease-back transactions in Silverberg, Bank Borrowing: An
Analysis of Recent Experience, 2 NAT'L BANK. REV. 213, 225 (1964).
25. Not allowing such an exception causes any debt incurred in such a transaction to be
ranked on a parity with, or junior to, the capital notes in the event that the subordination
is "triggered." While it is arguable that a lease transaction does not create "funded debt"
as it is generally known, drafters of agreements have covered the possibility of such a finding
with appropriate language. In addition, and perhaps more important, most capital note
agreements have a provision restricting the bank from incurring additional funded debt
(other than the capital notes). Thus, if the sale and lease-back transaction is not excepted
from the definition of funded debt, the bank may be precluded from entering such a
transaction.
26. See supra note 21.
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allow additional debt to be inserted in a position which is senior in right of
payment to his debt. To object to this might well precipitate receivership,
thus triggering the subordination clause. The subordinated creditor would
then be in the position of having to wait for payment, if any, until all senior
creditors have been paid in full. If the Comptroller should find it desirable
to invoke the provisions referred to in exception 11, he would certainly do
so in a situation where he thought that the bank could be saved. Such ac-
tion would, of course, be in the best interest of the holders of the capital
notes.
Section III: Historical Development and Economic Desirability of the
Issuance of Subordinated Debt by Commercial Banks
An exhaustive analysis of the economic advantages and disadvantages of the
issuance of capital notes or debentures by commercial banks is not within
the contemplation or the competence of this comment. Before discussing the
legal basis underlying the issuance of subordinated debt by commercial
banks, however, consideration should be directed both to some of the prac-
tical arguments for and against the issuance of capital notes and to the opin-
ions of financial writers. In this manner, legal considerations can be related
to the business objectives which prompt boards of directors to look to capital
notes as a means of raising additional capital funds.
Development of Subordinated Debt
The development of ab initio subordinated debt was largely the work of
sales finance companies. The first public issuance of subordinated deben-
tures, insofar as could be determined, was made in 1936.27 From that time
until the early 1950's, few institutions other than finance companies showed
much interest in this type of capital financing. Due to rapid business expan-
sion after World War II, the large cash accounts which had accumulated
during the war became insufficient to meet capital requirements. Retained
earnings were inadequate to meet the new capital needs and the sale of com-
mon stock alone to raise additional capital became less desirable as taxes
rose.28 Since taxes apply after interest charges and before dividends, 29 it be-
came economically advantageous to secure new funds by incurring debt,
within reasonable limits, rather than by selling preferred or common stock.
Corporate treasurers were quick to see the advantage in issuing debt instru-
ments to raise additional capital funds and the number of long-term debt
27. Johnson, supra note 4, at 4.
28. From 1941 to 1963, corporate income taxes, for those companies earning over the
minimum $25,000 per year base, rose from 31% to 52%. It thus became much more difficult
to meet capital needs from retained earnings as these earnings decreased in relation to gross
volume. Source of figure: 671 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 154.
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
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issuances increased steadily.3 0 Despite experiencing similar capital squeeze
problems,3 1 banks did not follow the trend established by industrial corpora-
tions. The banks continued to adhere to the conservative policy of selling
only common stock when adding to their capital funds. 32 In fairness to bank
management, it should be noted that bankers may well have thought that
there was no choice but to adhere to the more established policies, since reg-
ulatory authorities were adamant in opposing the sale of capital notes as a
means of raising bank capital. The Comptroller of the Currency was on rec-
ord publicly as being opposed to such issuances,33 and state supervisory au-
thorities generally followed similar policies. An exception to this general
rule was found in the policy of the Banking Commissioner of the State of
Minnesota. In 1958, he decided to permit banks to issue subordinated deben-
tures under authority of legislation enacted during the depression.
Bank Issuance of Debentures
During the 1950's and early 1960's, banks experienced tremendous growth
in demand for loanable funds.3 4 At the same time, however, deposits (the
primary source of loanable funds) did not increase at a rate comparable to
the growth of the gross national product. For the period 1947 to 1962, cap-
ital accounts of member banks 35 grew by 35 percent, while loans expanded
50 percent. The average annual rate of loan expansion was 9 percent, com-
pared to an annual capital growth rate of 6 percent.3 6 The increased profits
being realized on this expanded loan demand, lead to increasing pressure by
shareholders to pay out larger dividends. These same shareholders were re-
luctant to approve the sale of common stock. The apparent reason for this
phenomenon, at least in the medium and smaller size banks where control is
usually a factor, was the concern of shareholders that they might not be finan-
cially able to exercise their preemptive rights to purchase a proportionate
share of the new stock thereby leading to a dilution of their percentage of
control of the bank with each new issuance of common shares.
This pressure on bank capital was recognized by the Commission on
30. Corporate bond issues sold in 1947 totaled $5,036,000,000 as compared to new bond
offerings in 1944 of $2,669,000,000. During the period 1940-44, the yearly average of new
corporate bond issuances was $1,870,000,000, while the average for the 1945-49 period was
$5,127,000,000. MOODY, INDUSTP.IAL MANUAL a18 (1957).
31. W. KENNEDY, BANK MANAGEMENT 233-36 (3d ed. 1963).
32. This, of course, was in addition to the normal procedure of retaining a portion of
profits for capital expansion.
33. See statement of Ray M. Gidney, Comptroller of the Currency, in Hearings on S. 1451
Before a Subcomin. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 2, at 778-79 (1957).
34. Lindow, Bank Capital and Risk Assets, 1 NAT'L BANK. REV. 29, 31 (1963).
35. The term used to identify banks which belong to the Federal Reserve System.
36. Lindow, supra note 34, at 35-36.
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Money and Credit8 7 when, in its report to President Kennedy in 1961, it ex-
pressed concern about capital adequacy of financial institutions and recom-
mended forms of capital other than common capital stock, surplus, and re-
serves. "Two suggestions which should be explored," the Commission urged,
"are the authorization to issue debentures subordinated to the claims of the
depositors and to issue preferred stock."38 In 1962, the Advisory Committee
on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency completed its study of the
banking structure and the problems confronting the banks. It recommended
that the use of preferred stock and debentures should no longer be regarded
as emergency measures, but should be recognized as a normal method for
obtaining capital funds. Specifically, the Advisory Committee recommended
that the attitude of the Comptroller on this subject be liberalized and that
flexibility be afforded the banks by permitting the use, in appropriate cases,
of various features, such as convertibility or subordination.8 9 Shortly after
receipt of this report, the Comptroller published new regulations which
permitted national banks to issue preferred stock and capital notes or
debentures. 40
The only bank experience with subordinated debentures prior to the Ad-
visory Committee's report to the Comptroller was that acquired during the
Depression, when preferred stock and capital notes or debentures were sold
by state banks41 to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R.F.C.).42 This
experience was not wholely satisfactory, since at the time of the bank holiday
in 1933, bank stocks were virtually unsalable owing to the distressed financial
condition of banks generally and the "double liability" carried on bank com-
mon shares. 43 Banks throughout the country were compelled, by law or by
persuasion, to issue capital notes, debentures, or preferred stock to conceal
the fact that many needed to do so.4 4 The strongest banks retired these securi-
37. The Commission on Money and Credit was established in 1957 as an independent
organization by the unanimous vote of the Board of Trustees of the Committee for Economic
Development. The bylaws governing the Commission state that "It shall be the responsibility
of the Commission to initiate studies into the United States monetary and financial system."
38. Commission on Money and Credit, Money and Credit: Their Influence on Jobs, Prices,
and Growth 174 (1961).
39. Advisory Committee on Banking to the Comptroller of the Currency, National Banks
and the Future 81-83 (1962).
40. 12 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1967).
41. National Banks were specifically authorized by statute to issue preferred stock. Since
the provision authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to purchase capital notes
or debentures of a bank was directed at circumventing the double liability which attached
to the preferred stock of some state (but not national) banks, there was no need for the
Congress to consider national bank issuance of debentures at that time. 48 Stat. 5 (1933),
12 U.S.C. § 51 (a) (1964); 48 Stat. 6 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 51 (d), repealed, 61 Stat. 208 (1947).
42. A governmental agency organized in 1932 to render emergency financial assistance to
banks and other companies during the depression. The R.F.C. was liquidated in 1954.
43. J.F.T. O'CONNOR, THE BANKING CRISIS & RECOVERY UNDER THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRA-
TION 56 (1938).
44. See discussion of the problems encountered by the R.F.C. in J. H. JONES, FIFTY BILLION
DOLLARS 34-36 (1951).
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ties at the earliest permitted date, but the aura of "distress financing" had
attached to bank senior securities. With this history in mind, it is not difficult
to understand why banks were reluctant to rush forward with the issuance of
senior securities, even when confronted with the pressures exerted in the late
50's and early 60's.
A dvan tages
This psychological barrier was broken, however, when the Franklin Na-
tional Bank, a large New York institution issued preferred stock in 1962. In
the summer of 1963, Franklin National and the state chartered United Cali-
fornia Bank sold capital notes to the public. This emerging use of preferred
stock and capital notes as a means of raising bank capital caused bankers to
re-examine their previous attitudes and to objectively review the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of these instruments. Some considerations
which have been posited to explain the subsequent decision of many banks
to issue these instruments are listed below:
(1) The primary function of bank capital is to protect depositors against
loss in case of insolvency. 45 Another function is to act to maintain the con-
fidence which a bank must enjoy to continue in business and to prosper, i.e.,
to provide "staying power" for the bank during difficult periods so that time
and earnings can absorb losses.46 Capital notes, by virtue of their subordina-
tion provisions and in view of their generally long-term maturities, meet
both of these requirements. (2) A distinct tax advantage is afforded the bank
when issuing capital notes, since interest on the notes, unlike dividends, is a
tax deductible expense. 47 The effect of this strategic difference is to reduce by
approximately 50 percent the effective rate paid on the notes when the bank is
incurring the maximum tax levy. Capital notes issued at a coupon rate of
five percent in reality cost the bank only about two and one-half percent.48
(3) Leverage (the ratio of assets to equity investment)49 is increased, pro-
viding increased return on common capital, assuming that the funds derived
from the issuance of capital notes are profitably employed. (4) No dilution
of control of the corporation occurs, since the holders of the capital notes
are normally not entitled to a voice in corporate management. 50 (5) Reserve
45. W. KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 233; Silverberg, supra note 24, at 214-15.
46. H. D. CROSSE, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR COMMERCIAL BANKS 158 (1962).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 163.
48. For a vivid illustration of the economic effect of issuance of debentures vis-h-vis com-
mon capital, see Williams, Senior Securities-Boon for Banks? HARV. Bus. REV. 85, 87 (1963);
Silverberg, supra note 24, at 216-19; Nadler, Debentures v. Stock, BANKING MAGAZINE, Sept.
1965, at 39-40; THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, USE OF SENIOR CAPITAL BY COMMERCIAL
BANKS 23 (1967).
49. Silverberg, Bank Debenture Financing: A Comparison of Alternatives, 3 NAT'L BANK.
REV. 45 (1965).
50. Exceptions to this general rule do exist. See, e.g., N. Y. Bus. CORP. § 518 (McKinney
1964).
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requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve Bank and assessments charged
by the F.D.I.C. are not increased, since the notes are not classified as "de-
posits." 51 (6) The issuing bank is not required to purchase additional shares
of stock of the Federal Reserve Bank, since the required holding of such
shares is predicated upon the amount of "capital stock" outstanding.52 The
Fed does not consider capital notes to qualify within the definition of capital
stock.53 (7) The bank's liquidity needs54 are not substantially increased, for,
by virtue of the fixed term of the capital notes, the bank may plan its in-
vestments with a view to the date on which the notes will become due. (8)
Bookkeeping costs are reduced, since the capital notes or debentures are
normally held by a smaller number of persons than a like amount of com-
mon stock. (9) An additional source of funds is made available to the bank
through insurance company and pension trust investments. Many states re-
strict or prohibit investment in corporate stock by these large suppliers of
funds.5 5 (10) The bank's lending limit and other statutory limitations based
on capitalization are increased since the Comptroller of the Currency con-
siders the proceeds of the notes as a part of capital funds for such purposes.5 6
(11) The capacity for relative ease of retirement is achieved. The typical
capital note provides for call at the option of the issuing bank subject to cer-
tain negotiated terms. If a bank issues common capital which it subsequently
finds is not necessary, it is difficult to retire this capital. Prior authority of a
supervising agency is necessary in all capital reductions 57 and, even if such
permission is obtained, common shareholders are free to ignore requests for
tender of their shares for retirement. Even assuming the approval of a super-
visory agency for the bank's purchase of its own shares in the open market,
there is no guarantee that the shares will be available for purchase. Thus,
the issuance of subordinated notes gives the bank an added degree of flexibil-
ity in determining the size of its capital position.
Disadvantages
There are also certain disadvantages associated with bank issuance of cap-
ital notes. The first, already mentioned, is the historical association of bank
issuance of senior securities with the concept of financial weakness; this aura
51. See 12 C.F.R. § 204.2 (1967); 74 Stat. 547 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (b) (4) (1964) (F.D.I.C.
assessment base).
52. 49 Stat. 704 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 282 (1964).
53. 12 C.F.R. § 208.108 (1967).
54. "Liquidity" refers to the bank's ability to meet current demands for cash out of
available funds. "Solvency" relates to the overall surplus of assets over debt.
55. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 737a-737.22a (Smith-Hurd 1966); MAss. ANN. LAws
ch. 175 § 63 (1961).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7 (1967).
57. As to National Banks, see 38 Stat. 274 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 59 (1964).
58. Damerjian, Recourse to Bank Debt Capital-Leverage, Advantage and Problems,
FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Jan.-March 1964, at 1113.
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of "distress financing" has not completely disappeared.58 However, the issu-
ance of capital notes by such notably strong banks as First National City
Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Bankers Trust in New York City has gone far
to eliminate this negative aspect. A second possible disadvantage is the rela-
tive novelty of this type of capital instrument in bank balance sheets and its
yet unknown effect upon large, sophisticated depositors. It is possible that
banks with relatively large debt capital positions may be subject to deposit
withdrawal by large depositors during unstable periods.59 Other real con-
siderations for the bank contemplating issuance of subordinated debt are:
(1) The possibility that, at some time in the future, the sinking fund pay-
ments or interest payments may become due at a time when it would place
the bank in a serious financial squeeze; (2) the possible adverse effect which
additional "permanent" debt may have on the price of the bank's common
equity; and (3) possible difficulty in refunding at maturity of the notes,
either because interest rates may be so high as to render refunding imprac-
tical or because business is at such a low ebb that the bank is not producing
the earnings coverage to which investors look when appraising the invest-
ment qualities of capital notes and debentures. In relation to this, it may be
assumed that if business is slow and the bank does not presently need the
additional capital, management would likely choose to retire the capital
notes.
Section IV: The Ultra Vires Question
Throughout the discussion of the legal basis for the issuance of capital notes
by national banks, the reader should keep in mind that there are really two
questions under discussion: (1) whether national banks can legally issue
capital notes or debentures, and (2) whether such debt instruments can
validly be considered a part of capital or surplus for the purpose of comput-
ing lending limits imposed upon banks. These questions are entirely distinct.
The former concerns the power of a bank to borrow money on a long-term
basis; the latter revolves around interpretation by the Comptroller of a stat-
ute which does not specify whether or not capital notes or debentures may be
considered part of a bank's capital base. Neither question has been litigated.
The position of the Comptroller as to both has been challenged.
Comptroller's Regulations
In December of 1962, subsequent to the report of the Advisory Corn-
mittee,60 the Comptroller issued a regulation stating the position of his office
concerning issuance of capital notes or debentures by national banks:
(a) It is the policy of the Comptroller of the Currency to permit
59. Id. at 1139.
60. See text supra p. 73.
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the issuance of convertible or non-convertible capital debentures
by national banking associations in accordance with normal busi-
ness considerations.
(b) Subject to the provisions of 12 U.S.C. 82, the bank may, with
the approval of stockholders owning two-thirds of the stock of the
bank, entitled to vote, issue convertible or non-convertible capital
debentures in such amounts and under such terms and conditions
as shall be approved by the Comptroller, provided, however, that
the principal amount of capital debentures outstanding at any time,
when added to all other outstanding indebtedness of the bank, ex-
cept those forms of indebtedness exempt from the provision of 12
U.S.C. 82, shall not exceed an amount equal to 100%, of the bank's
unimpaired paid-in capital stock plus 50o of the amount of its un-
impaired surplus fund.61
In December 1963, the Comptroller ruled that capital notes issued by na-
tional banks have "all of the protective effect of capital and surplus insofar
as depositors are involved" and "may be included as a part of the aggregate
amount of unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus funds for the pur-
pose of computation of the limit on loans to individual borrowers contained
in 12 U.S.C. 84."62 His reasoning in reaching this conclusion is illustrated by
the following excerpt from the ruling:
An examination of the legislative history of the lending restric-
tions contained in 12 U.S.C. § 8463 indicated that protection of the
depositors is the primary purpose of restricting the amount of loans
to any person to a stated percentage of the capital and surplus. Con-
sequently, capital debentures and notes which stand in the same re-
lationship to depositors as traditionally recognized forms of capital
and surplus may be included in the loan base. The fact that, as to
shareholders, capital notes and debentures would have a preferen-
tial position is just as immaterial as is the fact that preferred share-
holders take precedence over common shareholders.6 4
At least one, and possibly both, of the Comptroller's positions were chal-
lenged by Chairman Wright Patman of the House Committee on Banking
and Currency when, in June of 1965, he presented the Comptroller with a
list of 29 charges which purportedly chronicled illegal acts by the Comp-
troller.65 Charge 24 concerned the issuance of capital notes and debentures
and the consideration of such instruments as part of the bank's capital for
purposes of the loan limits of 12 U.S.C. 84. It read as follows: "Not provided
61. 12 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1967).
62. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7 (1967).
63. Quoted in pertinent part infra p. 90.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7 (1967).
65. Hearings on H.R. 107 & H.R. 6885 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 289-92
(1965).
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by law and contrary to sound corporate and accounting practice." 66 In addi-
tion, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System had previously
issued a statement which placed the Board in opposition to the Comptrol-
ler.67 The statement maintained that, for purposes of certain Federal Re-
serve Act provisions 68 limiting loans and investments of member banks to a
specified percentage of their capital stock and surplus, "[c]apital notes or de-
bentures do not constitute 'capital,' 'capital stock,' or 'surplus.' "69 The
Comptroller did not alter his position in the face of this opposition, and
many national banks proceeded to issue both convertible and non-convert-
ible capital notes and debentures. 70
The National Bank Act contains no specific authority for the issuance of
capital notes or debentures by national banks. In fact, the Act contains no
specific authority to borrow. Because of this, those who feel that national
banks are acting outside the scope of their authority when issuing capital
notes have noted that the Financial Institutions Act of 1957 contained a pro-
vision for specific authorization to be given to national banks to issue capital
notes and debentures, and that the bill did not pass. 71 This is hardly com-
pelling evidence of the need for such specific statutory authority, however,
since failure to pass a specific piece of legislation has no interpretative value
in a court.7 2 If valuable for any reason, this reference to proposed legislation
serves only to illustrate the current state of equilibrium between advocates of
expansive and restrictive interpretation of the National Bank Act, since na-
tional banks subsequently began to issue these instruments and no statutory
expression of congressional disapproval has been forthcoming.
Origin of the National Bank Act Provisions
The Act, as it exists today, provides in pertinent parts: (1) that associa-
tions formed under it are for the purpose of "carrying on the business of
66. Id. at 291.
67. 12 C.F.R. § 208.108 (1967).
68. The Board's position relates to those provisions of the Federal Reserve Act which
limit member banks with respect to: (1) loans to affiliates, 48 Stat. 183 (1933), 12 U.S.C.
§ 371 (c) (1964); (2) purchases of investment securities, 42 Stat. 767 (1922), 12 U.S.C. §§ 24,
335 (1964); (3) investment in bank premises, 48 Stat. 184 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 371 (d) (1964);
(4) loans on stock or bond collateral, 38 Stat. 261 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 248 (m) (1964); (5) de-
posits with nonmember banks, 38 Stat. 263 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 372 (1964); and (6) the amount
of paper of one borrower that may be discounted by a Federal Reserve Bank for any member
bank, 34 Stat. 451 (1906), 12 U.S.C. §§ 84, 330, 345 (1964).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 208.108 (1967).
70. For a listing of convertible and non-convertible capital notes and debentures issued
by commercial banks since 1963, see THE AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION, USE OF SENIOR
CAPITAL BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 53-70 (1967).
71. Subcommittee draft of S. 1451, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21 (1957), provided for the issue
of capital notes or debentures by national banks when so provided in the articles of associ-
ation and approved by the Comptroller.
72. The Effect of An Unsuccessful Attempt to Amend a Statute, Correspondence between
Charles H. Willard and John W. MacDonald, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 336 (1959).
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banking"; 73 (2) that a national bank has the power "... to exercise by its
Board of Directors... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking; by discounting and negotiating promissory
notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of debt; by receiving de-
posits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bullion; by loaning money
on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing and circulating notes accord-
ing to the provisions of this Chapter"; 74 and (3) "No national banking associa-
tion shall at any time be indebted, or in any way liable, to an amount
exceeding the amount of its capital stock at such time actually paid in and
remaining undiminished by losses or otherwise, plus fifty percent of the
amount of its unimpaired surplus fund, except on account of demands of the
nature following .... 75 These provisions are all essentially the same as pro-
visions appearing in the National Currency Act of 1863.76
Section 11 of the 1863 Act adopted verbatim (with two irrelevant changes)
Section 18 of the New York Free Bank Act of 1838 which provided:
§ 18. Such association shall have power to carry on the business
of banking by discounting bills, notes and other evidences of debt;
by receiving deposites [sic]; by buying and selling gold and silver
bullion, foreign coins, and bills of exchange, in the manner speci-
fied in their Articles of Association for the purposes authorized by
this Act; by loaning money on real and personal securities; and by
exercising such incidental power as shall be necessary to carry on
such business...77
Section 8 of the National Bank Act of 1864 adopted, with only one relevant
change, the terms of the 1863 Act.
Section 8 provided that a national bank might exercise
... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking by discounting and negotiating promissory
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evidences of debt; by re-
ceiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin and bul-
lion; by loaning money on personal security; by obtaining, issuing,
and circulating notes according to the provisions of this Act .... 78
The change mentioned above was a transposition of the clause "... such in-
cidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on such business..." from the
end of the recital of powers of the 1863 Act to the beginning, and the con-
73. REv. STAT. § 5133 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 21 (1964).
74. 42 Stat. 767 (1922), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1964).
75. 38 Stat. 264 (1913), 12 U.S. C. § 82 (1964).
76. The Act of 1863, 12 Stat. 665, was originally known as the "National Currency Act."
The revised Currency Act, 13 Stat. 99 (1864), was referred to as "The National Banking Act."
By the Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 123, 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1964), this Act was renamed "The
National Bank Act."
77. N. Y. LAws ch. 260 (1838).
78. Compare 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864), with 42 Stat. 767 (1922), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1964).
1967]
Catholic University Law Review
sequent elimination of the original beginning clause "power to carry on the
business of banking." The transposition has been explained as one
... made primarily to avoid redundancy by the elimination of one
of the two clauses as to the 'power to carry on the business of bank-
ing' and that it was not the intent of Congress thereby to make a
major change in the existing powers of National Banks, namely, to
take from all their implied powers to carry on the business of bank-
ing which were not necessarily incidental to carry out the specific
powers, and which implied powers were granted to them by the
1863 Act.7 9
Both the debates accompanying passage of the 1863 Act, and a study con-
ducted by the National Monetary Commission in 1909-1910, indicate that
the National Bank Act, as enacted in 1863 and amended in 1864, adopted
in substance the free banking law of the State of New York.8 0 It appears that
Congress intended to confer upon national banks all powers of New York
State banks to carry on the banking business, except as otherwise provided
by the National Bank Act.
Interpretation of the New York Act
A generally accepted canon of statutory construction is that when Con-
gress enacts a statute in terms that have received a settled interpretation by
the courts it in effect adopts that interpretation.8 ' As previously noted, Con-
gress was aware that it was adopting in substantial form the New York Bank-
ing Law of 1838. It seems highly probable, though no authority for the state-
ment can be found, that the leading case of Curtis v. Leavitt82 was known to
79. Trimble, The Implied Powers of National Banks to Issue Letters of Credit and Accept
Bills, 58 YALE L. J. 713, 720 (1943). Citing: Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report,
1863, as printed in Secretary of the Treasury, Report on the Finances 54 (1863); Inland
Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517 (1940).
80. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1141-42 (1863) (statements by Rep. E. G. Spaulding
and Stephen Baker); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1269 (1864) (statement by Rep.
James Brooks); A. DAVIS, THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 7-8 (1911); J. HEIN-
BERG, THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY: ITS HISTORY, ACTIVITIES AND
ORGANIZATION 6 (1926); MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, BANKING STUDIES 14, 43 (1941); R. ROBERTSON, THE COMPTROLLER AND BANK
SUPERVISION, galleys to Chapter 3 (to be published).
It is also known that Senator John Sherman of Ohio, one of the authors of the National
Currency Act, checked THE BANKS OF NEW YORK, THEIR DEALERS, THE CLEARING-HoUSE, AND
THE PANIC OF 1857 (1859) by James Sloan Gibbons out of the Library of Congress. (He had
this book in his possession from January 2 to January 21, 1863, during which time the Na-
tional Currency Act was revised by Senator Sherman). This book describes in detail the
duties and responsibilities of the major officers of a bank, the bookkeeping operations of a
bank, and clearing house operations. The author's intent is stated as attempting "to give a
picture of the banks of New York as they are . Library of Congress, Mss. Division,
Miscellaney, Receipt Books L 1861-1863.
81. See J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 5209 (Horach ed. 1943).
82. 15 N.Y. 9 (1857). Some evidence that this case was known to Congressmen can be
taken from the fact that the Library of Congress had a book by John Cleaveland on its
shelves entitled THE BANKING SYSTEM OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, WITH NOTES AND REFER-
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Congress when the National Bank Act was passed, and that Congress in-
tended National Banks to have the same broad powers to carry on the busi-
ness of banking as the New York banks had under the decisions of the courts
of that state prior to 1863.
In 1857, the Court of Appeals of New York in the Curtis case conclusively
settled the New York law as to the implied power of a New York bank to
borrow under the above quoted terms of the New York Banking Law of
1838.83 The court based the right to issue bonds described as "payable in
large sums, at distant periods of time,"8 4 in the "incidental power of corpora-
tions, and especially in the nature of banking and the incidents and neces-
sities which attend that business."85 In addition, the following broad lan-
guage on implied powers of banks comes from Curtis:
The implied powers [of a bank] exist by virtue of the grant [to
do the banking business], and are not enumerated and defined; be-
cause no human sagacity can foresee what implied powers may, in
the progress of time, the discovery and perfection of better methods
of business, and the ever-varying attitude of human relations, be
required to give effect to the express powers. They are, therefore,
left to implication.8 6
This case has been recognized for its valuable consideration of implied pow-
ers of banks, especially the power to borrow. Numerous cases decided under
the National Bank Act cite it as the leading authority on the question.87
Case Law under the National Bank Act
A considerable body of case law has developed which interprets the pro-
visions of Section 24 (7), and to a more limited extent, those of Section 82 of
Title 12 so as to find in national banks an implied power to borrow. The
courts have consistently interpreted the National Bank Act as giving nation-
al banks an inherent right to borrow money whenever it is reasonably neces-
sary in the proper conduct of the bank's business. In the early case of First
National Bank v. National Exchange Bank,88 the Supreme Court stated:
ENCES TO ADJUDGED CASES (1857). This book gives an historical sketch of the New York bank-
ing system, banking laws, and includes the General Bank Act of 1838, known as the Free
Bank Law, and cases decided by the courts of New York relating to this Act. At page 324
there is a summary of the New York Supreme Court's decision on the case of Curtis v. Leavitt,
with a note that the case was now pending in the court of appeals. Furthermore, this case
was referred to popularly as the "Million Trust Case," indication that at least it was well
enough known to have picked up a slang name.
83. Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 40 (1857).
84. Id. at 73.
85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 157.
87. See, e.g., Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125 (1899).
88. 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
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Authority is thus given [by the National Bank Act] to transact
such a banking business as is specified, and all incidental powers
necessary to carry it on are granted. These powers are such as are
required to meet all the legitimate demands of the authorized busi-
ness, and to enable a bank to conduct its affairs, within the general
scope of its charter, safely and prudently. This necessarily implies
the right of a bank to incur liabilities in the regular course of its
business, as well as to become the creditor of others.8 9
In the later case of Western National Bank v. Armstrong,90 a certain
amount of doubt was cast upon the implied power of a national bank to bor-
row. The Court was called upon to determine whether or not the Fidelity
National Bank was indebted to the plaintiff bank on account of a loan made
by the plaintiff at the request of the vice-president and principal executive
officer of Fidelity. Specifically, the question presented was whether this of-
ficer, without specific authority from the board of directors, could legally
bind Fidelity in its transaction with the plaintiff. Recovery was denied to the
plaintiff on the grounds that the transaction was not properly authorized
and that the bank did not receive the proceeds of the loan. In his opinion,
Mr. Justice Shiras included the following qualifying language:
Nor do we doubt that a bank, in certain circumstances, may be-
come a temporary borrower of money. Yet such transactions would
be so much out of the course of ordinary and legitimate banking as to
require those making the loan to see to it that the officer or agent
acting for the bank had special authority to borrow money.91
It is difficult to find in this case a specific purpose of limiting the authority
of national banks to borrow. Rather, it appears that the Court was more con-
cerned with the fact that the bank had derived no benefit whatsoever from
the transaction. The overriding concern of the Court seems well stated in the
following language of the opinion.
The moneys were appropriated by Harper [the vice-president]
to his own use, or, at all events, it does not appear that the bank
ever got a penny of the borrowed money or any benefit or advan-
tage whatever by reason of the transaction.92
In any event, the Western case has little, if any, precedent value as a result
of subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court limiting the case to its facts.98
In Auten v. United States National Bank,9 4 the Supreme Court specifically
89. Id. at 127.
90. 152 U.S. 346 (1893).
91. Id. at 351.
92. Id. at 352.
93. See Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, 176 U.S. 618, 628 (1900); Auten v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125 (1899).
94. Supra note 93.
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rejected the claim that the Western case established the rule that borrowing
by a national bank was "out of the usual course of business." Mr. Justice
McKenna noted:
Some of its language [referring to the Western case] may seem to
do so, but it was used in suggestion of a question which might be
raised on the facts of the case, without intending to authoritatively
decide it.95
The opinion went on to discuss the business of banking in the following
terms:
Banking in much, if not in the greater part of its practice, is in a
strict sense borrowing, and we may hesitate to condemn it as illegiti-
mate, or regard it as out of the course of a regular business, and
hence suspicious and questionable.
A banker, Macleod says, is a trader who buys money, or money
and debts, by creating other debts, which he does with his credit-
exchanging for a debt payable in the future one payable on de-
mand. This, he says, is the essential definition of banking. "The first
business of a banker is not to lend money to others but to collect
money from others." (Macleod on Banking, vol. 1, 2d ed. pp. 109,
110.) And Gilbart defines a banker to be "a dealer in capital, or
more properly a dealer in money. He is an intermediate party be-
tween the borrower and the lender. He borrows of one party and
lends to another." (Gilbart on Banking, vol. 1, p. 2.) (Emphasis in
original.)
The very first banking in England was pure borrowing. It con-
sisted in receiving money in exchange for which promissory notes
were given payable to the bearer on demand.... The relations cre-
ated are the same as those created by the issue of notes. In both a
debt is created-the evidence only is different. In one case it is a
credit on the banker's books; in the other his written promise to
pay. In the one case he discharges it by paying the orders (cheques)
of his creditor; in the other by redeeming his promises. These are
the only differences....
But it may be said these views are elementary and do not help to
a solution of the question presented by the record, which is
not what relation a bank has or what power its officers may be con-
sidered as having in its transactions with the general public, but
what is its relation and what power its officers may be considered as
having in its transactions with other banks. Indeed, the question
may be even narrower-not one of power, but one of evidence. If so,
the views expressed are pertinent. They show the basis of credit up-
on which banks rest, and the necessity of having power to support
it; it may be to extend it. Borrowing is borrowing, no matter from
95. Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, supra note 93, at 143.
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whom. Discounting bills and notes may require rediscounting
them; buying bills and notes may require selling them again.
Money may not be equally distributed. It is the bank's function to
correct the inequality. The very object of banking is to aid the oper-
ation of the laws of commerce by serving as a channel for carrying
money from place to place, as the rise and fall of supply and de-
mand require, and it may be done by rediscounting the bank's pa-
per or by some other form of borrowing. Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 1;
First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122; Cooper
v. Curtis, 30 Maine, 488. (Emphasis added.)
A power so useful cannot be said to be illegitimate, and declared
as a matter of law to be out of the usual course of business, and to
charge everybody connected with it with knowledge that it may be
in excess of authority. It would seem, if doubtful at all, more like a
question of fact, to be resolved in the particular case by the usage of
the parties or the usage of communities. (Emphasis added.)96
This latter language appears to be of particular significance when read
with the opinion of the court in Chemical National Bank v. Armstrong,97
where the court was considering facts similar to those presented in the Auten
case. In Chemical National Bank, the following language appears:
What is the proper business of a bank, and what incidental powers
may be necessary to carry on the business of banking, is not purely
a question of law, nor altogether a question of fact. It is a mixed
question of law and fact, depending, as to fact, upon circumstances
and location.. . . [T]he locality of the bank, the nature of its business,
and the time of the transaction, may have much to do with deter-
mining what incidental powers are necessary to carry on the busi-
ness of banking.9 8
The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has addressed itself to
the power of a national bank to borrow is Wyman v. Wallace.99 In that case,
the American National Bank did not have sufficient cash to provide for pay-
ment of a large amount of its deposits which were shortly to come due. In
order to provide the necessary funds to make such payment, it entered into
negotiations with the Union National Bank, whereby the latter was to as-
sume all the liabilities of the former, receiving cash and such bills receivable
as it was willing to accept at par and without recourse. The difference be-
tween the amounts so received and the liabilities assumed was to be repre-
sented by three non-negotiable promissory notes of the American Bank, the
payment of which was to be secured by a pledge of all its remaining assets.
This contract was carried out. Union moved into, and took possession of, the
96. Id. at 141-43.
97. 76 F. 339 (C.C. Ohio 1896).
98. Id. at 343, 344.
99. 201 U.S. 230 (1906).
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offices of American. Upon adjustment, the difference was found to be
5201,000, for which American executed to Union three non-negotiable prom-
issory notes payable in one, two, and three years, respectively. A suit was
brought by the assignee of one of the notes, and one of the issues before the
Court was whether the notes executed by American National Bank were val-
id obligations. The Court, in sustaining the validity of the obligations,
stated:
The question, therefore, is, whether a national bank, finding it-
self embarrassed, with a large amount of assets, much in excess of its
obligations, yet without the cash to make payment of those which
are due and urgent, can borrow to meet those pressing demands. A
very natural answer is, why not? It is not borrowing money to en-
gage in a new business. It simply exchanges one creditor for others.
There may be wisdom in consolidating all its debts into the hands
of one person. At least such a consolidation cannot be pronounced
beyond its powers. When time is obtained by the new indebtedness
(in this case a year) it gives the borrowing bank and its officers and
stockholders time to consider and determine the wisdom of attempt-
ing a further prosecution of business. In the case of an individual
it would be a legitimate and often a wise transaction. It is not in
terms prohibited by the National Bank Act. [Citing Aldrich v.
Chemical National Bank, 176 U.S. 618]100
The lower federal courts have sustained the validity of borrowing by na-
tional banks in a similar manner. Weber v. Spokane National Bank,l o' was a
suit brought against Spokane National and its receiver upon three promis-
sory notes which had been given in payment for bank furniture and fixtures
supplied by the plaintiff. As a special defense, the receiver pleaded that at
the time of making the notes the bank had already incurred indebtedness
and had become liable for amounts aggregating a sum much greater than
the amount of its paid up capital stock, so that by virtue of the National
Bank Act the bank was prohibited from incurring the indebtedness sued up-
on. Before reaching the question of the validity of loans which exceed the
statutory limit on indebtedness, the court interpreted the debt-limiting pro-
vision of the National Bank Act 10 2 as implying a power on the part of a na-
tional bank to borrow money, stating:
What is the meaning of the word used? Taken in their ordinary
sense and import, we take them to mean that a national banking as-
sociation is prohibited from contracting debts or liabilities other
than within the four classes named,1°3 except to the extent of its
100. Id. at 243.
101. 64 F. 208 (9th Cir. 1894).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 82 (1964).
103. At the time this case was decided, there were four exceptions to the general limit on
debt imposed by § 82, now there are eleven such exceptions.
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paid-up, unimpaired capital stock,104 and to that extent there is an
implied authority to become indebted upon any contract or trans-
action which lies within the scope of its power .... 105
Similar language is found in Eastern Township Bank v. Vermont National
Bank of Saint Albans,106 a case in which suit was commenced to enforce a
claim against the receiver of a national bank to which the plaintiff had made
a loan. The court referred to the statutory limit on indebtedness of a nation-
al bank and stated:
That section provides that no association shall at any time be in-
debted or in any way liable to an amount exceeding the amount of
its capital stock actually paid in and undiminished.... This im-
plies that it may become indebted within the limit, even if the pow-
er to make contracts generally should be held to apply to some-
thing else. Powers impliedly given are as well conferred as those ex-
pressly given. [Citing National Bank v. Graham, 100 U.S. 699]107
Long-Term Subordinated Borrowing
This reiew of the legislative history of Sections 24 and 82 of the National
Bank Act and the case law decided under these provisions indicates that na-
tional banks do have the power to borrow money. But, in a discussion of
bank issuance of capital debentures (long-term subordinated debt) the
further question arises: Do national banks have the power to engage in this
type of borrowing? Reverting to the language of the Court in Wyman v.
Wallace,0 8 "A very natural answer is, why not?" The cases thus far decided
have all dealt with relatively short-term unsubordinated borrowing at a time
when deposits of national banks were not insured; 109 the power to bor-
row was sustained. It is less difficult to come to the conclusion that a national
bank whose depositors are insured has the power to borrow on a long-term
subordinated basis. The extended term allows management to plan care-
fully for the eventual repayment or refunding of this debt at a stated ma-
turity and the deposit insurance protects depositors in the event of insol-
vency. 110 Add to this an agreement placing certain creditors (the capital note
holders) in a position junior to that of depositors and other creditors, and it
is difficult to conceive of a court finding insufficiency of authority to incur
the debt.
The power to issue capital notes or debentures falls squarely within the
104. Now premised on capital stock and unimpaired surplus.
105. Weber v. Spokane Nat'l Bank, supra note 101, at 209.
106. 22 F. 186 (C.C. Vt. 1884).
107. Id. at 188.
108. Supra note 99.
109. See supra note 8. Deposit insurance on a national basis did not begin until 1933.
110. See 1958 F.D.I.C. ANN. REP. for an excellent discussion of the procedures used by the
Corporation in fulfilling its role as insurer.
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criteria set out in First National Bank v. National Exchange Bank, in that
"[t]hese powers are such as ... enable a bank to conduct its affairs, within
the general scope of its charter, safely and prudently."' Admittedly, there is
language in some of the earlier cases1 12 to the effect that banks have the power
to become only temporary borrowers of money. The courts, however, have
never squarely considered the question of whether or not a bank can engage
in long-term subordinated borrowing. If any conclusions are to be drawn
from the early bank borrowing cases beyond the obvious conclusion that
banks do have the right to borrow, it must be that the power should be
determined by "the usage of the parties or the usage of communities." 113 As
noted earlier," 4 the issuance of subordinated debentures is a well established,
commonly accepted practice of corporations and is generally considered by
financial writers and the business community to be a legitimate corporate
function. An awareness of this background, together with the fact that banks
have wholeheartedly adopted this means of raising additional capital," 5
points strongly to the conclusion that issuance of capital notes or debentures
is an accepted practice and a common usage.
Comptroller's Authority to Issue Regulations
In addition to the above reasons for sustaining the power of national
banks to issue capital debentures, there is a positive ruling of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency that the issuance of these notes is within the power of na-
tional banks. 116 While the National Bank Act does not specifically empower
the Comptroller to interpret its provisions," 7 rulings or interpretations by
the Comptroller have long been the practice."18 The Supreme Court, in In-
land Waterways Corp. v. Young," 9 recognized the interpretative function of
the Comptroller's office when it stated:
The policy underlying Congressional legislation and reflected in
the history of governmental deposits is confirmed by the explicit
recognition of that official in whom is centered oversight of the ad-
ministration of the National Banking Act .... The Comptroller of
the Currency, to be sure, must himself move within the orbit of the
111. 92 U.S. 122, 127 (1875).
112. See Western Nat'l Bank v. Armstrong, supra note 90.
113. Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, supra note 93, at 143.
114. See text supra pp. 71-72.
115. See figures on bank issuance cited supra note 20.
116. 12 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1967).
117. An exception to this statement pertains with respect to investment securities rulings,
see 42 Stat. 767 (1922), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1964).
118. ATTORNEY GEN. COMM. ON AD. PROCEDUREs, FEDERAL CONTROL OF BANKING, Mono-
graph No. 14, 89-90 (1940); T. KANE, THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF BANKING 90-91 (1922);
Fox, Supervision of Banking by the Comptroller of the Currency, in REDFORD, PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION AND POLICY FORMATION 155 (1956).
119. 309 U.S. 517 (1940).
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National Banking Act. Illegality cannot obtain legitimacy through
practice. But when legality itself is in dispute-when Congress has
spoken at best with ambiguous silence-a long continued practice
pursued with the knowledge of the Comptroller of the Currency
is more persuasive than considerations of abstract conflict between
such a practice and purposes attributed to Congress. More than half
a dozen agencies have thought it their duty to safeguard deposits in
nearly a hundred banks by transactions similar to those before us.
This practice had the approval of the Comptroller because he be-
lieved it within the power of the National Banking Act.... When
dealing with such necessarily argumentative concepts as those of
which the law of ultra vires is so largely composed, the responsible
and pervasive practice of public officers bent on safeguarding the
public interests ought to carry the day even were the issue more in
doubt than we believe it to be.120
The silence of the National Bank Act as to the power of a national bank
to issue capital notes, when combined with the positive ruling of the Comp-
troller that issuance of these notes is within the power of such banks,
would appear to fall squarely within the language of the court in
Inland Waterways.
Effect of Ultra Vires Finding
A final question which should be discussed briefly is the possible effect
upon notes presently issued and outstanding if a court were to find the issu-
ance of capital notes or debentures to be beyond the power of a national
bank. The answer appears to lie in the language of the decision of Weber v.
Spokane National Bank:121
[A]n indebtedness which a national bank incurs in the exercise of
any of its authorized powers, and for which it has received and re-
tains the consideration, is not void from the fact that the amount of
the debt surpasses the limit prescribed by the statute, or is even in-
curred in violation of the positive prohibition of the law in that re-
gard. 22
This comment, together with the language in Aldrich v. Chemical Na-
tional Bank,123 would seem to adequately protect a purchaser of national
bank capital notes. The Court, in Aldrich, spoke as follows:
If the bank's want of power under the statute to make such a con-
tract of purchase may be pleaded in bar of all claims against it bas-
ed upon the contract-and we are assuming, for the purposes of this
case, that it may be-it is bound upon demand, accompanied by a
120. Id. at page 524, 525; cf. Justice Roberts' dissent at 526, 527.
121. 64 F. 208 (9th Cir. 1894).
122. Id. at 211.
123. 176 U.S. 618 (1900).
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tender of the price paid, to surrender the bonds to its vendor. The
bank, in this case, insisting that it obtained the bonds of the plain-
tiff in violation of the act of Congress, is bound, upon being made
whole, to return them to him. No exemption or immunity from the
principle of right or duty is given by the national bank act [sic].124
The Court went on to quote from Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman's
Palace Car Co.,"25 as follows:
A contract ultra vires being unlawful and void, not because it is
itself immoral, but because the corporation, by the law of its crea-
tion, is incapable of making it, the courts, while refusing to main-
tain any action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven to
do justice between the parties, so far as could be done consistently
with adherence to law, by permitting property or money, parted with
on the faith of the unlawful contract, to be recovered back, or com-
pensation to be made for it. In such case, however, the action is not
maintained upon the unlawful contract, nor according to its terms;
but on an implied contract of the defendant to return, or, failing to
do that, to make compensation for, property or money which it has
no right to retain. To maintain such an action is not to affirm, but
to disaffirm, the unlawful contract. 12 6
The opinion concluded,
Independently therefore, of any question as to the scope of the
power of a national bank to borrow money to be used in its busi-
ness, we hold that the Fidelity Bank became liable to the Chemical
Bank by using the money obtained from the latter, under the arrange-
ment made by Harper in his capacity as vice president; consequently,
the decree recognizing the claim, of the Chemical Bank for the
amount of the loan of March, 1887, was right. 27
These considerations appear to amply illustrate that national banks do
have the power to borrow money and that such power extends to the right
to issue capital notes or debentures. Even if this act of the bank should be
found to be ultra vires, however, the purchaser would be amply protected
in his right to receive the funds which were advanced to the bank.
Debentures as a Part of the Bank's Capital Base
As previously noted, there are numerous incentives to issue capital notes
or debentures. 28 One such advantage is that the capital notes or debentures
may be counted as a part of the bank's capital base for the purpose of com-
puting the bank's lending limit to any one individual. While issuance of cap-
124. Id. at 632.
125. 139 U.S. 24 (1891).
126. Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'l Bank, supra note 123, at 633.
127. Id. at 638.
128. See discussion supra pp. 74-75.
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ital notes might be attractive to national banks, even without this added in-
centive, this single item is sufficiently important to be considered separately.
The validity of the Comptroller's ruling that capital notes or debentures
do constitute a part of the bank's capital base for the purpose of determin-
ing Section 84 limitations must, of course, be assessed against the background
of the statute. The pertinent language reads as follows:
The total obligations to any national banking association of any
person, copartnership, association, or corporation shall at no time
exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the capital stock of such cor-
poration actually paid in and unimpaired and 10 per centum of its
unimpaired surplus fund. 29
As used in this statute, the terms "capital stock" and "unimpaired surplus
fund" have never been defined by Congress. 130
A reading of the entire 1864 Act,131 however, leaves little doubt that the
term "capital stock" as used therein meant the basic equity security. This
conclusion emanates from a reading of Section 12 of the Act, which specified
that "the capital stock of any association formed under this Act shall be di-
vided into shares of one hundred dollars each .. " It cannot be said that
Congress intended thereby to exclude capital notes as a means of measuring
the total allowable credit which a national bank could extend to any one
person. Such "debt securities" were not even known at the time of the statute's
enactment.
While there is nothing in the legislative history of the 1864 Act to indicate
the intent of Congress in setting lending limits by means of percentage of
capital stock, an explanation of the provision was supplied in later Congres-
sional debates. 32 The current loan limit provision of the National Bank Act
was enacted in 1906.133 The provision derives from Section 29134 of the 1864
Act. The new provision increased the base from 10 percent of capital stock to
10 percent of capital stock and 10 percent of unimpaired surplus fund, with
an overall limit of 30 percent of capital stock. In the course of debate on
the amendment, the rationale of tieing lending limits to capital stock was
said to be "to prevent the incorporation of banks with a small capital stock
and a large paid-in surplus, as under such conditions the security of the de-
129. REv. STAT. § 5200 (1875), as amended, 34 Stat. 451 (1906), 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964).
130. See 48 Stat. 5 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 51 (c) (1964), for definition of capital stock, not per-
tinent here.
131. 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
132. H.R. REP. No. 1835, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (1906).
133. 34 Stat. 451 (1906), 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1964) provides in pertinent part: "The total
obligations to any national banking association of any person, copartnership, association, or
corporation shall at no time exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the capital stock of such
association actually paid in and unimpaired and 10 per centum of its unimpaired surplus
fund." (Emphasis added.)
134. 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864).
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positors would be limited to the stockholders' liability, which is 'to the extent
of the amount of stock owned at par value thereof, in addition to the amount
invested.' "135 At the time of the 1906 amendment, bank shareholders were
generally subject to double liability based on par value of their shares. 18 6
By tieing loan limits to capital stock, banks were discouraged from setting
an initial low par value and large paid-in surplus, thereby limiting share-
holder liability while, at the same time, increasing the bank's lending limit.
Now, however, double liability no longer characterizes ownership of national
bank stock.18 7 An interpretive expansion of the "lending limit" measuring
stick of "capital stock" would not, therefore, be in derogation of Congressional
intent on this issue.
Without the double liability issue, the purpose of the Section 84 limitation
appears to be one of diversification of risks. The limitation of individual liabil-
ity to 10 percent of capital and surplus is intended to protect depositors and
shareholders. 8 With the issue thus narrowed to one of protection of these
parties, the inclusion of capital notes in the capital base appears sound. De-
positors and other senior creditors are protected by the subordination pro-
vision of the notes, and the shareholders cannot be heard to complain since
they are the parties who initially approve capital note issuance. 13 9
The words of the statute do say "capital stock," but the apparent purpose
of the provision belies a limitation to the strict semantical interpretation.
Not only has Congress never specifically excluded capital debentures from
inclusion in the loan base, but on the two occasions when it has legislated
concerning these instruments, it has treated them as a part of bank capital.' 40
In Section 51 (b)(1) of Title 12 which sets up a method of determining impair-
ment of capital, the liability of capital debentures is ignored. This treatment
necessarily results in the debentures being considered not as debt, but as
capital. Section 321 of Title 12 is even more explicit. For purposes of this
statute, capital notes and debentures issued by the applying bank and pur-
chased by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R.F.C.) are specifically
designated as included within the terms "capital" and "capital stock." The
Fed has taken the position that only those capital notes and debentures pur-
chased by R.F.C. qualify for consideration as capital under this provision.
141
135. 40 CONG. REC. 5313 (1906) (Statement of Representative Arsene Pujo).
136. 13 Stat. 102 (1864), repealed, 73 Stat. 457 (1959), 12 U.S.C. § 64 (1964).
137. See 48 Stat. 189 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 64 (a) (1964).
138. 1900 COMP. OF CuRR. ANN. REP. xx; see also 12 C.F.R. § 7.7 (1967).
139. Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 14.5 (1967), issuance of capital notes or debentures requires
"approval of stockholders owning two-thirds of the stock of the bank, entitled to vote." In the
alternative, that provision allows notes or debentures to be issued "without such (specific
shareholder) approval if authorized by its (bank's) Articles of Association."
140. See 48 Stat. 5 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 51 (b) (1) (1964); 38 Stat. 259 (1913), 12 U.S.C. § 321
(1964).
141. 12 C.F.R. § 208.108 (1967).
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Be that as it may, the clear recognition by Congress that these instruments
possess definite capital characteristics is inescapable.
It should be noted that neither of the above statutes applies to national
banks. They are presented solely for their value as indicating Congressional
recognition that capital notes and debentures partake of the nature of capi-
tal. Congress has never addressed itself to the question of who can issue capi-
tal debentures.142 It has thus far dealt only with the circumstances under
which they should be considered "capital stock" for state banks. A plausible
reason why these provisions have not been applied to national banks is that
Congress already has effective control over these institutions through the
Comptroller of the Currency. No such effective control over the capital ac-
counts of state banks is otherwise available to Congress.
Consideration of subordinated notes or debentures as a part of the equity
base of non-banking concerns is not unique. They are commonly considered
as a part of the capital structure of industrial and financing companies. 143 In
the more analogous context of regulated industries generally, subordinated
debentures have become an important financing tool for public utilities. In
fact, within the banking field, they are recognized by several states as consti-
tuting a part of bank capital. 4 4
In a situation so lacking in Congressional direction as that concerning the
power of national banks to issue capital debentures and to include them in
capital, a clear ruling by the Comptroller is persuasive evidence of the cor-
rectness of his view.145 Congress has not spoken clearly on this issue; consid-
eration of subordinated debentures as capital is common practice in many
industries and is well recognized by financial writers; and there is precedent
for the ruling found in the practice of several states. These factors, when
added to the fact that Congress has never specifically defined the term "capi-
tal stock" as used in Section 84, go far to support the ruling of the Comptrol-
ler. He alone is charged with the responsibility for enforcing this provision
and his ruling, based on expertise in the field of banking, should stand un-
less clearly in error.146
Whatever tenuousness does attach to the position of the Comptroller on
this issue could, in the opinion of this writer, be dispelled by an addition to
his present ruling. This addition could take the form of a caveat that any
bank that desires to include capital notes or debentures as a part of its capital
base will not be allowed to retire this "borrowed equity" if repayment would
142. See supra note 71.
143. Johnson, supra note 4; see also, SCHWARTZ, supra note 15, at 160; J. F. WESTON, MANA-
GERIAL FINANCE 226, 356 (1962).
144. For a compilation of the provisions of the various state codes, see THE AMERICAN
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, USE OF SENIOR CAPITAL BY COMMERCIAL BANKS 71-75 (1967).
145. See Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, supra note 79.
146. See Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961); Liberty
Nat'l Bank v. McIntosh, 16 F.2d 906, 909 (4th Cir. 1927); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Smith,
56 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1932).
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result in impairment of capital or continuation of a previously existing capi-
ital impairment. Many of the states which allow inclusion of capital deben-
tures in a bank's capital base have used such a proviso 147 and it apparently
has not detracted from the salability of debenture issues by banks under
their jurisdiction. 48
Section V: Enforcement Under the Bankruptcy Act
The subject of enforcement of subordination agreements has been exten-
sively discussed in several recent articles, 1 49 but none of these has considered
the special problems which may arise in a bank receivership situation. Banks
may not become either voluntary or involuntary bankrupts witin the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1 0 the Act under which the case law on subordination agreements
has developed. However, a brief consideration of this existing case law should
help to establish a background from which to discuss the possible results of
similar litigation under the National Bank Act. A determination of the legal
rights of capital noteholders vis-a-vis bank depositors, other creditors, and
shareholders will hopefully emerge from this inquiry.
Several theories have been put forth to explain the legal basis underlying
enforcement of subordination agreements. The courts have spoken of these
agreements as creating an "equitable lien"'' in favor of the senior creditor;
they have been thought to create an "equitable assignment"'152 to the senior
creditor of the subordinated debt claim in bankruptcy and the dividends
payable thereon; the subordinated creditor has been said to hold the divi-
dends received as "constructive trustee"'9 3 of the holder of the senior debt;
and the contract doctrine of "third party beneficiary" has been applied in
order to enforce the rights of the senior debt holder as against the subordi-
nated creditor. 54 The most recent case on this issue, In re Credit Industrial
Corporation, 5 was decided without recourse to any of the above theories.
The court in that case reviewed the note agreement and observed that
the lender knew that until CIC [the common debtor] should satisfy
"every one of its present or future loans, ... now in existence or
147. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 662 (1955).
148. Among state banks in California for instance, United California Banks has issued
$70,000,000 in debentures, and Wells Fargo Bank has issued $75,300,000.
149. Everett, Subordinated Debt-Nature and Enforcement, 20 Bus. LAw. 953 (1965); Cal-
ligar, Subordination Agreements, 70 Yale L.J. 376 (1961); Golin, Debt Subordination as a
Working Tool, 7 N.Y.L.F. 370 (1961).
150. 30 Stat. 547 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
151. In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc., 16 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1926).
152. In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. La. 1932).
153. In re Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co., 148 F. Supp. 647 (D.N.H. 1956), aff'd per curiam
sub nom. Dodge-Freedman Poultry Co. v. Delaware Mills, Inc., 244 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1957).
154. In re National Discount Corp., 212 F. Supp. 929 (W.D.S.C.), afJ'd sub nom. Austin
v. National Discount Corp., 322 F.2d 928 (4th Cir. 1963).
155. 366 F.2d 402 (2nd Cir. 1966).
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hereafter incurred from any bank, finance company .... or any oth-
er institutional organization hereinafter referred to collectively as
'institutional creditors.' " CIC would not pay the notes in whole or
in part. 156
The presence of this provision, together with the provision whereby the note-
holders (subordinated creditors) specifically waived all notice of acceptance
of the subordination by any institutional creditor or of the reliance by any
institutional creditor upon the subordination, caused the court to state:
In bankruptcy, the parties claiming rights to participate in the
assets of the bankrupt must do so in accordance with such contrac-
tual rights against the debtor as they may have purchased or ac-
quired. Bankruptcy does not provide a forum for the realignment of
rights or priorities but serves only as a forum for the recognition of
rights already acquired. (Emphasis added.) 57
The court thus shifted from a position of seeking to find some justification for
enforcement of contractual subordination, such as the third party beneficiary
theory, to placing the onus upon the subordinated debt holder to show the
court some compelling reason for not enforcing the contract as it stands.
This logic is appealing.
The Supreme Court has not passed directly on the question of the enforce-
ability of an agreement to subordinate. In Prudence Realization Corp. v.
Geist,158 however, the Court indicated that it would, in a proper case, give
effect in a proceeding in bankruptcy or in an arrangement or reorganization
proceeding to an agreement to subordinate debt. The Court did not state its
rationale for this statement, but it has been said to be that "contract rights
acquired pursuant to an agreement enforceable under state law will be hon-
ored and given effect in a bankruptcy arrangement or reorganization proceed-
ing under federal law."'1 59
The principal contention of the parties opposing enforcement of subor-
dination agreements is that such enforcement would violate the provisions
of Section 65 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 6 0 This section provides in part
that "[d]ividends of an equal percentum shall be declared and paid on all
allowed claims, except such as have priority or are secured." This argument
has been consistently rejected by the courts.' 6' On several occasions they have
expressly held that Section 65 (a) does not prevent parties from making en-
156. Id. at 407.
157. Ibid.
158. 316 U.S. 89 (1942).
159. Everett, supra note 149, at 963.
160. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) (1964).
161. See In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 53 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afJ'd sub nom.
Elias v. Clarke, 143 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 778 (1944); In re Aktie-
bolaget Kreuger & Toll, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938); Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin, 78
F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1935).
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forceable subordination agreements, so long as such agreements do not vio-
late public policy or the priorities established by the Bankruptcy Act. 6 2 Nei-
ther the senior debt nor the subordinated debt have been found to have
"priority" or to be "secured" within the meaning of the Act. The senior debt
and the subordinated debt are proved under the Act on a parity with one
another and on a parity with the other debt of the borrower that has neither
priority nor is secured within the meaning of the Act. The courts have taken
the position that in distributing dividends payable on account of subordina-
tion to the holders of the senior debt, they are merely exercising their pow-
ers as courts of equity to disburse, in accordance with lawful contracts, divi-
dends that are payable under the Act on account of claims that have been
proved under the Act in accordance with the statutory priorities and other
applicable statutory provisions.
The cases most often cited as supporting enforcement of subordination
agreements are In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 163 Elias v. Clarke,64 In re
National Discount Corp., 1'5 In re Handy-Andy Community Stores, Inc.,166
Searle v. Machanics' Loan & Trust Co., 167 Bird & Sons Sales Corp. v. Tobin,o8
and In re Geo. P. Schinzel & Son, Inc.169 To this list will surely be added the
Credit Industrial case mentioned above. 170 A detailed analysis of the facts
and holdings of each of these cases will not be attempted here, since this has
been ably accomplished elsewhere. 17 Suffice to say that they do support the
statement that courts have, with few exceptions, 172 enforced for the benefit
of senior creditors the subordination agreements presented to them. Given
a situation where the intent to subordinate was clearly expressed, 73 and no
element of fraud appears, 7 4 the only serious question that has recently faced
162. § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U.S.C. 104 (a) (1964), sets out
five specific categories of debts that will be accorded priority in bankruptcy. This list is
exclusive.
163. Supra note 161.
164. Supra note 161.
165. Supra note 154.
166. Supra note 152.
167. 249 F. 942 (9th Cir. 1918).
168. Supra note 161.
169. Supra note 151.
170. Supra note 155.
171. See Everett, supra note 149, at 962-71; Calligar, supra note 149, at 383-92.
172. In re Goodman-Kinstler Co., 32 Am. Bankr. R. 624 (S.D. Cal. 1914).
173. In the recent case of In re Joe Newcomer Fin. Co., 226 F. Supp. 387 (D. Colo. 1964),
the court appears to have been troubled by the question of whether the purchasers really
bargained for subordination of the principal of the notes or subordination of the interest
on the notes only. See comment on this case in Everett, supra note 149, at 961.
174. In Pioneer-Cafeteria Feeds, Ltd. v. Mack, 340 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965), a peculiarly
complex fact situation was presented. Pioneer extended credit to a Canadian corporation
(Northland) and obtained from the principal stockholder of Northland (Wyse) an agree-
ment guaranteeing payment of all liabilities of Northland to Pioneer and subordinating all
liabilities owing to Wyse from Northland to the prior payment of the debt owed to Pioneer.
On September 30, 1959, Wyse filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the district court
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the courts is whether or not proof of reliance by the senior creditors upon
the subordination is necessary.
In both Kreuger & Toll and Elias, the courts enforced for the benefit of
senior creditors a subordination agreement to which they were not a party
and upon which they were not alleged to have relied. In Bird & Sons, Searle,
and Community Stores, and another leading case, In re Dodge-Freedman
Poultry Company,'75 the courts appear to have placed at least some emphasis
upon an apparent reliance by senior creditors on the subordination provi-
sions of the loan. A leading commentator in the field of bankruptcy law has
opined that "only where subsequent creditors rely on a subordination agree-
ment should a court of equity employ the principle of estoppel to subordi-
nate."'176 In the Credit Industrial case, 177 the district court considered the lack
of proof of reliance by the senior creditors to be determinative and held that
such lack of reliance was fatal to enforcement of the subordination provision.
On appeal, the circuit court effectively dispensed with this reliance argu-
ment in the following language:
[T]he enforcement of such agreements is not based on any theory of
equitable estoppel. In our opinion the district court erroneously re-
lied on the doctrine of equitable estoppel as a basis for its position
and failed to recognize the distinction between equitable and con-
sensual subordination in bankruptcy. Equitable subordination,
which is founded upon estoppel, is the doctrine invoked by courts
to deny equal treatment to creditors based on some inequitable or
unconscionable conduct in which they have engaged, or a special
position which they occupy vis-h-vis the bankrupt that justifies sub-
ordination of their claims.... On the other hand, consensual or
contractual subordination, of which the debt subordination agree-
ments involved here are prime examples, occurs when a creditor
and the bankrupt agree to create priorities among debts. Such
in Ohio and was adjudicated bankrupt. Pioneer continued to advance funds to Northland
until the latter filed its voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the bankruptcy court of Ontario,
on November 2, 1959. The Canadian court ordered Wyse's dividends in the Northland
bankruptcy to be paid to Pioneer under the subordination clause. Pioneer then filed its
proof of claim in the Wyse bankruptcy for the balance due under Wyse's guarantee of the
Northland debt. The referee in the Wyse bankruptcy allowed this claim but ordered that
no dividends be paid on the claim until the other creditors of Wyse had received dividends
on their claims equal to the per centum of Pioneer's claim against Wyse which was paid by
application of Wyse's dividends in the Northland bankruptcy, i.e., 26.43%. The court of
appeals upheld the ruling of the referee.
In refusing to recognize the subordination in the Canadian court and applying the doc-
trine of equitable subordination, the circuit court cited Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
This citation, together with the court's reference to lack of notice to Wyse's creditors of the
existence of the guaranty agreement, may indicate that the court perceived some elements
of fraud or overreaching.
175. Supra note 153.
176. Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 VAND.
L. REv. 83, 92 (1961).
177. In re Credit Indus. Corp., 366 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1966).
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agreements have been uniformly enforced according to their terms
by bankruptcy courts.... The doctrine of equitable estoppel is
clearly irrelevant to a determination of whether a lawful subordina-
tion agreement is enforceable in bankruptcy proceedings and the
district court erred in invoking it to support its determination that
enforcement of such agreements is conditioned on proof of reli-
ance. (Emphasis added.)178
The circuit court went on to state its holding as follows:
To conclude, we hold that a senior creditor can enforce in bank-
ruptcy a subordination agreement which was executed for his bene-
fit without alleging or proving that he advanced funds in reliance
thereon provided that the agreement does not interfere with the
statutory priorities set up by the Bankruptcy Act ... and the agree-
ment is otherwise lawful. The district court's determination that
non-reliance is a defense to the enforcement of such an agreement
by a bankruptcy court is reversed. (Emphasis added.)179
The current state of the law concerning enforcement of subordination agree-
ments entered into by parties who come under the purview of the
Bankruptcy Act thus appears to favor the enforcement of contractual sub-
ordination agreements by a court of equity, irrespective of reliance on the
part of senior creditors, so long as the agreement is not otherwise unlawful.
After dispensing with the reliance argument in general, the circuit court
noted:
When a junior [subordinated] creditor establishes that the subor-
dination agreement is unlawful, it may be reasonable and neces-
sary, if equity is to be done, to require a senior creditor to prove
that he relied on the subordination agreement, without actual or
constructive knowledge of any infirmity in the agreement, in ad-
vancing funds to the bankrupt as a condition to receiving priority
in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate. In cases where the un-
derlying subordination agreement is unlawful, a court is not con-
fronted with the problems of enforcing express contractual provi-
sions but, rather, with the entirely separate problem of determining
which general creditors should bear a loss caused by the debtor, a
problem which may have to be resolved by reference to equitable
principles. 18 0
The court was here addressing itself to an allegation that the debt instru-
ments had been issued in violation of the Securities Act of 1933, and the
case was remanded for further findings on this and other asserted defenses.
This language of the court will be of interest when we consider, infra, its
possible application to a finding of national bank issuance of subordinated
debentures as ultra vires.
178. Id. at 408-09.
179. Id. at 410.
180. Id. at 409.
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What Can Be Expected in the Banking Context?
Consideration of the results to be expected if a national bank, having cap-
ital debentures outstanding, goes into receivership must be premised on the
fact that the decision will be reached under the National Bank Act and not
under the Bankruptcy Act. As stated by Mr. Justice Field, speaking for a
unanimous court in Cook County National Bank v. United States:181
We consider that [National Bank] act as constituting by itself a
complete system for the establishment and government of national
banks .... Everything essential to the formation of the banks, the
issue, security, and redemption of their notes, the winding up of the
institutions, and the distribution of their effects, are fully provided
for, as in a separate code by itself, neither limited nor enlarged by
other statutory provisions with respect to the settlement of demands
against insolvents or their estates.182
It should be noted, however, that while the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act
do not govern, cases decided under that Act have been referred to as helpful
guides in the determination of issues arising from the liquidation of a na-
tional bank.188
Parties opposing enforcement of the subordination provisions in capital
notes or debentures issued by a national bank subsequently placed in liqui-
dation can be expected to contend that enforcement of the subordination
agreement violates 12 U.S.C. § 194, which provides in pertinent part:
... [T]he Comptroller shall make a ratable dividend of the money
so paid over to him by such receiver on all such claims as may have
been proved to his satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, and, as the proceeds of the assets of such asso-
ciation are paid over to him, shall make further dividends on all
claims previously proved or adjudicated; and the remainder of the
proceeds, if any, shall be paid over to the shareholders of such as-
sociation, or their legal representatives, in proportion to the stock
by them respectively held.
The similarity is striking between Section 194's requirement of a "ratable
dividend" and the demand of Section 65 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act for pay-
ment of "dividends of an equal percentum." As stated before, the courts have
interpreted Section 65 (a) as not creating an inexorable rule for the distribu-
tion of dividends, 184 but what of the interpretation of Section 194?
In the case of Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville,185 the Supreme
181. 107 U.S. 445 (1882).
182. Id. at 448. See also Chemical Nat'l Bank v. Armstrong, 59 F. 372 (6th Cir. 1893); Ken-
nedy v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, 11 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1935).
183. Kennedy v. Boston-Continental Nat'l Bank, supra note 182.
184. See text supra pp. 94-96, for discussion of this point.
185. 173 U.S. 181 (1899).
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Court interpreted this provision in the context of a suit to determine the
rights of a secured creditor of a national bank in liquidation. The Court
stated:
The requirement of equality of distribution among creditors by
the national banking act [sic] involves no invasion of prior contract
rights of any such creditors, and ought not to be construed as having,
or being intended to have, such a result. (Emphasis added.)186
And in another portion of this same opinion, the Court said:
[A]ll rights, legal or equitable, existing at the time of the commis-
sion of the act of insolvency which led to the appointment of the
receiver, other than those created by preference forbidden by sec-
tion 5242, are preserved .... 187
Further interpretation of this Section is provided in Chemical National Bank
v. Armstrong where the court, speaking through Judge Taft, stated:
The national banking act [sic] was framed to secure equality of dis-
tribution among the creditors, so far as is consistent with the pre-
vious contract rights of those creditors. (Emphasis added.) 8 8
Recall the words of Judge Moore in the Credit Industrial case that "bank-
ruptcy does not provide a forum for the realignment of rights or priorities
but serves only as a forum for the recognition of rights already acquired" and
an interpretive parallelism consistent with the similarity in wording of the
two statutes is seen.
The courts have not as yet had occasion to apply the provisions of Section
194 to the situation of a national bank liquidation which involves outstand-
ing capital notes or debentures. But the analogy between the statutory ex-
pression and judicial interpretation of this statute and that of Section 65 (a)
of the Bankruptcy Act is so close as to all but compel the conclusion that in
a simple liquidation context, the position of a capital noteholder of a na-
tional bank would be similar to that of any other subordinated creditor-
junior in right of payment to senior creditors. The fact that the F.D.I.C. will
be subrogee of all insured depositors (the largest class of senior creditors),
to the extent of their insured claims, should not complicate the issue of en-
forcement of the subordination. In the one case that could be found 8 9 where
such a situation existed, the court had no difficulty in coming to the conclu-
sion that the rights of the F.D.I.C. are no greater and no less than those of
the insured depositors. Thus, the court held that when the full principal
sum of depositors' (and other senior creditors') claims had been paid by the
186. Id. at 147.
187. Id. at 143.
188. 59 F. 372, 376 (6th Cir. 1893).
189. Jamison v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 149 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1945).
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Receiver, the subordinated creditor (in this case, the R.F.C.) was entitled to
repayment of principal before senior creditors' claims for interest payments
could be met.
The question of the corporate power of a national bank to issue capital
notes or debentures has been considered and the conclusion reached that
such issuance is not ultra vires. There remains to be considered, however,
the language in the Credit Industrial case concerning reliance and the pos-
sible effect which its application could have if a court were to find national
bank issuance of capital notes to be unlawful. Recall that Judge Moore felt
such a situation would present a court with the problem of determin-
ing which general creditors should bear a loss caused by the debtor, "a prob-
lem which may have to be resolved by reference to equitable principles."' 190
Application of the reliance theory to a bank capital note situation need
only be reflected upon momentarily to see the sheer inequity of its result. By
far the largest group of senior creditors of a bank is its depositors. Even a
relatively small bank has thousands of them. For these senior creditors to
shoulder the burden of proving reliance upon the subordination would be
an impossibility. None but the largest corporate customers are usually aware
of the general financial condition of the bank, let alone possess a more so-
phisticated understanding of the relative position of the subordinated note-
holders to the other creditors of the bank.
Though Judge Moore framed his comment in terms of unlawful subordi-
nation agreements, generally it is difficult to rationalize his position without
recourse to a finding of fraud or knowledge of fraud on the part of the senior
creditor. For without such a finding, what right does the recalcitrant junior
creditor have to assert his equality with the senior creditor? If a court were
to find that national banks lack the corporate power to issue capital notes or
debentures, what possible effect would such a finding have upon the equities
governing in a liquidation proceeding? Such a finding would not affect the
financial situation which caused the purchaser to subordinate his claim in
order to achieve a higher return on his investment. The financial data upon
which he premised his decision would not be changed in the least. Why then
should he be allowed to seek equality with the senior creditors? Barring reli-
ance on their part, what equity would dictate a dilution of depositors' and
other senior creditors' claims against the insolvent bank?
Even assuming that the subordinated creditor was induced by the bank to
purchase the notes based on fraudulent financial information, there appears
to be no compelling reason to treat the depositors and the capital noteholders
alike in the receivership context. Admittedly the noteholder was wronged
by the bank, but why should this weigh against the innocent depositor? As
190. In re Credit Industrial Corp., 366 F.2d 402, 409 (2d Cir. 1966).
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between the depositor and the noteholder, the latter doubtless had consider-
ably more information upon which to base his decision and he admittedly
purchased the notes as an investment rather than for the purpose of safe-
keeping and convenience. It is submitted that the equities of the situation
would fall on the side of the depositor-senior creditor.
Section VI: Conclusion
This paper has considered at some length the questions which arise with re-
spect to issuance of capital notes or debentures by commercial banks. The
reasons for this lengthy treatment lie both in the fact that this has been a rel-
atively unexplored area of legal writing and that this mode of raising funds
is already of significant importance in banking, and will in all probability
become of even greater importance in the future. As our economy grows
more complex, the tools which the banks need to fulfill their proper role as
a catalyst of economic resources must likewise increase in complexity. The
movement of banks into the area of subordinated debt issuance is only one
manifestation of this necessary evolution.
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